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ABSTRACT
“This, too, was myself”: Empathic Unsettlement and the Victim/Perpetrator Binary in Robert
Louis Stevenson’s Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde
Brittany Bruner
Department of English, BYU
Master of Arts
At first glance, Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde is a tale that reinforces binaries.
One of these is the self/other binary that is central to David Hume’s and Adam Smith’s theories
of sympathy that conceive of a self imaginatively identifying and experiencing fellow-feeling for
an other. However, this notion is complicated because Jekyll and Hyde are the same person.
Further, many critics argue that Stevenson actually challenges binary thinking. While Hume and
Smith do not challenge the self/other binary in connection with sympathy, trauma theory critics
do challenge a self/other binary that lies at the heart of sympathy: the victim/perpetrator binary.
Noted trauma theorist Dominick LaCapra develops a method of empathizing called empathic
unsettlement where a secondary witness listens with empathy to a victim’s traumatic witness
while recognizing the difference of his or her position as a witness. He argues that perpetrators
may also warrant understanding, but this understanding does not come through empathy.
However, one of the hallmarks of empathic unsettlement is that it does not neatly resolve or
replace traumatic narratives. Therefore, I argue that empathic unsettlement could also be a useful
method for allowing a perpetrator to witness. While practicing empathic unsettlement for a
perpetrator may not be worth the risk in real life, performing a thought experiment in literature
can test how using empathy might provide a better way to theorize perpetration. Using two
witnesses who attempt to practice empathic unsettlement for Jekyll and Hyde, Dr. Hastie Lanyon
(who fails), and Mr. Gabriel John Utterson (who succeeds), I will show how empathic
unsettlement could be used for both a victim and perpetrator to tease out the complexities of
assessing a traumatic situation.

Keywords and terms: Robert Louis Stevenson, Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, John
Utterson, Hastie Lanyon, Henry Jekyll, Edward Hyde, sympathy, David Hume, Adam Smith,
fellow-feeling, empathy, Dominick LaCapra, empathic unsettlement, binary, self, other, victim,
perpetrator
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Introduction
When unfolding his gruesome, fantastic tale, Robert Louis Stevenson’s iconic character
Dr. Jekyll states that “all human beings, as we meet them, are commingled out of good and evil,”
but “Edward Hyde alone, in the ranks of mankind, was pure evil” (45). However, when Jekyll
looks at his reflection after he has transformed himself into Hyde, he regards Hyde with a “leap
of welcome” (45). “This, too, was myself” (45) he says. Jekyll sees Hyde as both foreign and
familiar, both other and self, a problematic paradox because an other cannot be a self.
From the nineteenth century to the present, critics have regarded Jekyll and Hyde first
and foremost as an exploration of this contradictory duality. Noting this, Jill Matus writes, “In a
general way, Stevenson’s novel is the literary expression of divided being: ‘Jekyll and Hyde’ is a
phrase that has entered common parlance as a synonym for the split self, and, as Stevenson
explained later, he wanted to give voice in the tale to the ‘strong sense of man’s double being’”
(161). The iconic duo of Jekyll and Hyde represents all kinds of conceptions of good and evil,
and this was recognized even in Stevenson’s time. Nineteenth-century newspapers featured
various stories using Jekyll and Hyde as a metaphor for people living secret lives or presenting
(and hiding) dual agendas in fields as diverse as medicine, religion, and politics.1 Contemporary
scholarship has expanded this discussion to a host of other binaries, including the culture/nature
binary (Ferrer-Medina), the relationship of duality in Freud’s seminal text The Interpretation of
Dreams (D’Amato), the role of the left brain and the right brain in creating dual personalities
(Stiles), the binary between Western civilization and perceptions of non-Western people as
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  

1
See “A Psychological Study” for an example of people acting like Jekyll and Hyde in relation to contemporary medical cases;
“Dr. Jekyll in England, Mr. Hyde in Ireland” for an example of a writer using Jekyll and Hyde as a metaphor for duality to
compare governments and politicians; Walker for a review of the novella that comments on duality; “Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde”, a
review in Star, for a discussion of Stevenson experiencing duality in his dreams in order to come up with the novella; “A Jekyll
and Hyde” in the Hampshire/Portsmouth Telegraph for a story about a Jekyll and Hyde evangelist criminal; and “Dr. Jekyll and
Mr. Hyde at the Colonial Office” in Freeman's Journal for an example of a complaint against a government official in which he
is compared to Jekyll and Hyde when acting against the best interests of Jamaica.
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savages (Shyalaja), the binary of private and public personas as explored through the motif of
doors (Frank), the duality of hidden and exposed expressions of masculinity (Cohen), and the
duality between social class and social status (Danahy), to name a few.
However, one binary—the binary of self and other that resides at the heart of discussions
of sympathy—has been overlooked by critics of Stevenson’s novella, an odd omission
considering Stevenson’s general interest in the concept of feeling for others. Stevenson was a
great advocate of sympathetic relationships, believing that the best way to practice sympathy was
to try “putting oneself in the place of others, and appropriating the situation so as to conceive it
from within and not from without” (Kelman 194). As he outlines in a letter on his experiences
with the Samoan people, Stevenson viewed sympathy as a way “to enter into something outside
of oneself, something that does not touch one’s next neighbor in the city omnibus.” Being able to
do this was “the proof of not being a barbarian” (qtd. in Kelman 194). Stevenson’s personal
views on sympathy influenced the way that he developed his characters and stories, as noted by
John Kelman: “[Stevenson’s] writing gave him a wide and open field, and it is because of his
extraordinary power of putting himself in the place of others that the characters are so natural
and the situations so impressive” (194).
Sympathy is a major component of Jekyll and Hyde, and Stevenson’s notions of
sympathy were most likely informed by Adam Smith and David Hume, fellow Scots for whom
sympathy functioned as a product of imagination. Their theories provide a useful method for
considering the sympathetic relationships between the other characters and Jekyll and Hyde
when they are conceived of as two separate people, because their theories rely on the self/other
binary. Thinking about sympathy in the novella in this way is difficult, however, because in
Jekyll and Hyde, the self, Jekyll, is also the other, Hyde. To deny sympathy to Mr. Hyde, an evil
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perpetrator, would also cause one to deny sympathy to Dr. Jekyll, a victim of Hyde. This leaves
characters in the novella with a difficult choice: do they sympathize with Dr. Jekyll, and, by
extension, Mr. Hyde? Or do they refuse sympathy to both?
This blurring of the self/other binary presents a unique complication with regard to the
question of how one should feel for an other. Theories of sympathy during Stevenson’s time do
not address this complication, but modern theorists of trauma do. Noted trauma theorist
Dominick LaCapra is specifically concerned with the self/other binary that lies at the heart of
sympathy: the victim/perpetrator binary. When we introduce trauma theory and notions of
perpetration and victimization into Stevenson’s text, the complicated conception of self and other
presented in the novella is complicated still further. For while Hyde perpetrates against Jekyll
(among others), making Jekyll a victim, Jekyll also perpetrates against Hyde. With whom, then,
should the characters align their sympathies, and what is at stake in doing so?
LaCapra believes there is a lot at stake when we use empathy to theorize trauma. Unlike
Smith and Hume, he does not think specifically in terms of sympathy but rather discusses the
limitations of empathy, which he defines as an “affective component of understanding [that] is
difficult to control” (Writing History 102). His definition of empathy is similar to a Smithean
“fellow-feeling” that “limits objectification and exposes the self to involvement or implication in
the past, its actors, and victims” (102). LaCapra observes that when one chooses to empathize
with a victim of trauma, bearing witness to the pain of perpetration, there is the potential that one
might overidentify with the victim and begin to displace the victim’s narrative with one’s own.
Thus, he suggests that “desirable empathy involves not full identification but what might be
termed empathic unsettlement in the face of traumatic limit events, their perpetrators, and their
victims” (102). Empathic unsettlement protects victims by allowing them to witness to an
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empathetic person while recognizing that they can never approach a level of understanding on
par with the victim’s understanding of the experience. It “poses a barrier” to the kinds of
“closure in discourse” that come from a listener’s attempt to impose a narrative of healing,
resolution, or even understanding onto the traumatic experience (41); instead, the listener
remains empathic but distant, unsettled. This notion of empathic unsettlement was originally
conceived in discussions of Holocaust traumas, but writers and theorists—including literary
critics—have employed LaCapra’s idea in their examinations of written texts as a way of
exploring trauma and fellow-feeling.
Using the concept of empathic unsettlement can become problematic, however, because
it relies on a sharp division between victim and perpetrator, but the victim/perpetrator binary is
often blurred in life, as it is in Jekyll and Hyde. Victims may be perpetrators before, during, or
after their victimization. Similarly, perpetrators may have been victims at one point and may
even see themselves primarily as victims, which they may believe leads them to perpetration.
Sharon Lamb argues that “the large majority of perpetrators had enough free will not to do what
they did, and, more controversially, that more than a few victims also had enough free choice to
make their self-blame, at times, reasonable” (12). She goes on to suggest that this causes
perpetrators who were once victims to deny responsibility for their actions, but she contends that
“victimization should not mean absolution from all responsibility” (21). At the same time, one
cannot ignore a perpetrator’s own victimization; it, too, is a component of the trauma inflicted by
the perpetrator on others.
Studying both victimization and perpetration, then, is essential to coming closer to
understanding most traumatic situations. Refusing to consider the situation from the perspective
of the perpetrator solidifies a binary that is rarely black and white. In the difficult process of
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assessing trauma, not recognizing the ways in which a perpetrator might be treated with
empathic unsettlement forces a division of self and other that may not accurately reflect the
reality of the situation. This is the case in the literary example of Jekyll and Hyde. If Jekyll were
seen only as a victim who had no cause for blame, readers would not fully understand the actions
of Hyde, nor would they be acknowledging the fundamental premise of Stevenson’s tale: that
Jekyll is Hyde. Keeping victim and perpetrator in separate categories would also mean failing to
see the ways in which Jekyll perpetrates against Hyde and the ways in which Hyde is a victim of
Jekyll’s experiment. In Stevenson’s novella, it is necessary to study perpetration in the same way
we study victimization in order for the trauma narrative to be accurately represented. This is
where empathic unsettlement has the potential to become a useful tool.
Because Jekyll and Hyde presents us with a victim who is also a perpetrator and a
perpetrator who is also a victim, Stevenson’s text provides us with the opportunity to test
LaCapra’s victim-only notion of empathic unsettlement in ways that LaCapra—who is working
with real people instead of fictional characters—cannot. LaCapra is hesitant to extend empathic
unsettlement to perpetrators, but when one extends this kind of empathy to the victim Jekyll, one
necessarily extends it to the perpetrator Hyde. A successful application of this type of empathy
allows readers to witness an experiment involving empathic unsettlement toward one of
Victorian literature’s most nefarious perpetrators. Stevenson presents two characters who,
motivated by empathy, undertake this action: Dr. Lanyon, who fails in his attempt, and Mr.
Utterson, who succeeds. Dr. Lanyon represents the fears one may have in practicing empathic
unsettlement for a perpetrator. As LaCapra predicts, Lanyon’s efforts to feel for Hyde result in
his overidentification with Hyde. He becomes another victim of this perpetrator, traumatized to
the point of death. Through Mr. Utterson, however, Stevenson shows that practicing empathic
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unsettlement for a perpetrator does not require one to excuse perpetration and does not lessen the
victim’s experiences, nor does it necessarily result in more trauma. Utterson succeeds in doing
what LaCapra suggests is not possible; he extends empathic unsettlement to a perpetrator as part
of a process of traumatic witnessing, and he is therefore able to offer a more complete
explanation of the trauma surrounding Jekyll/Hyde.
Stevenson’s text thus provides a roadmap for analyzing empathetic reactions to the
characters of Jekyll and Hyde. There are many instances in which characters practice a Humean
and Smithean version of sympathy (similar to LaCapra’s empathy before employing empathic
unsettlement) for Dr. Jekyll that relies on imaginative identification, fellow-feeling, and a
self/other binary that causes them to express revulsion toward Mr. Hyde. But these moments,
when considered in the context of eighteenth-century notions of sympathy, cannot account for
the blurred binary of self/other or victim/perpetrator represented by Jekyll/Hyde. When
considered in the context of LaCapra’s notion of empathic unsettlement, however, we find a case
study in Jekyll and Hyde that demonstrates how empathy might be extended to both victims and
perpetrators, making empathic unsettlement a method by which to document and critique a
traumatic experience from multiple perspectives.
Sympathy in Jekyll and Hyde
Eighteenth-century theories that conceive of sympathy as a bringing together of self and
other via imagination provide a lens by which to understand sympathetic expression in
Stevenson’s novella. Adam Smith, whose 1759 The Theory of Moral Sentiments has had a large
influence on theories of sympathy, believed that sympathy involves imagination put in action by
“our capacity to transport ourselves, imaginatively, from the position of spectator to actor, and
then back to the position of spectator” (Mitchell 78). This is a fluid relationship in which the

Bruner
	
   7
person inhabits the mind of those he or she sympathizes with and then returns to his or her own
consciousness. Smith writes that “by the imagination . . . we enter as it were into his body, and
become in some measure the same person with him, and thence form some idea of his sensations,
and even feel something which, though weaker in degree, is not altogether unlike [his
sensations]” (2). This is a process that Smith refers to as “fellow-feeling.” However, Smith is
careful to note that this experience still only exists within ourselves: “[Our senses] never did, and
never can, carry us beyond our own person” (2). Thus, for Smith, sympathy requires a working
imagination in which the sympathizer identifies intensely (but without any unsettlement) with an
other and yet remains separate from the person requiring sympathy. One might become “the
same person” with the other and may even feel the same emotions as the other, but all of this
takes place metaphorically, in one’s head. The sympathizer is never actually transported outside
of himself or herself.
Hume, writing in the second volume of his influential A Treatise on Human Nature
(1740), outlines a similar process of practicing sympathy, also emphasizing the importance of the
imagination in the sympathetic relationship. Hume suggests that sympathy can even arise
through a description of an event that happened long ago or far away: “’Tis certain, that
sympathy is not always limited to the present moment, but that we often feel by communication
the pains and pleasures of others, which are not in being, and which we only anticipate by the
force of imagination” (169). The observer can use an imaginative process to generate sympathy
for a situation that may not be presently occurring. Hume claims that this transmission of
feelings is possible and is partly dependent on physiognomy (Duncan 286). Observing someone
physically in distress may create an opportunity for sympathetic identification, but it might also
generate antipathy if the person in distress possesses a physiognomy that does not elicit
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sympathy. Thus, sympathy, according to Smith and Hume, is often dependent on visual or
written cues that appeal to the senses in a way that triggers sympathy or a lack of sympathy from
the observer.
Stevenson’s novella models Smith’s and Hume’s conceptions of sympathy by presenting
characters who sympathize with Jekyll by first observing his distress and then imagining
themselves in Jekyll’s situation. Part of this ability to imagine Jekyll’s feelings is dependent on
his pleasing physiognomy, which invites characters to feel sympathy for him. Stevenson
describes Jekyll as “a large, well-made, smooth-faced man of fifty, with something of a slyish
cast perhaps, but every mark of capacity and kindness” (Stevenson 12). These marks of kindness
draw sympathy from Mr. John Utterson, a lawyer and Jekyll’s friend who narrates much of the
novella. Utterson feels sympathy for Jekyll the moment that he learns of Jekyll’s association with
Hyde. He believes that Hyde might be the manifestation of one of Jekyll’s past misdeeds, “[a]nd
the lawyer, scared by the thought, brooded awhile on his own past” (11). He places himself in
Jekyll’s situation and worries about how it would feel to have the ghost of old sins return. These
imaginings are heightened by visible changes to Jekyll’s “well-made” physiognomy that signal
to Utterson the need for even greater sympathy for his friend, as Jekyll’s troubles compound.
When Utterson questions Jekyll about Hyde, for example, Stevenson writes, “The large
handsome face of Dr. Jekyll grew pale to the very lips, and there came a blackness about his
eyes” (13). Utterson can physically see Jekyll’s distress at the mention of Hyde. “I am painfully
situated, Utterson,” Jekyll tells him, “It is one of those affairs that cannot be mended by talking”
(13). In a signal that Utterson cares for Jekyll, and perhaps imagines himself in Jekyll’s situation,
he promises Jekyll, “You know me: I am a man to be trusted. . . . [A]nd I make no doubt I can
get you out of it” (13). While in this situation he does not explicitly state that he has placed
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himself imaginatively in Jekyll’s position, Utterson feels sympathy toward Jekyll and promises
to help him after seeing and hearing Jekyll’s distress.
Jekyll’s staff, too, experience fellow-feeling when they fear that the doctor is being
blackmailed or held captive by Hyde. His servants declare that they are willing to “place
[them]selves in a position of some peril” to help Jekyll, an indication that they feel deeply for the
man (31). Poole, the butler, is even ready to face danger in rescuing Jekyll, so great is his fellowfeeling. His feelings for Jekyll are, in fact, paramount in Poole’s desire to help rescue Jekyll from
the man he believes is holding him captive: “A man has his feelings,” he explains to Utterson
when asked why he is willing to help (32). More than just feeling for Dr. Jekyll, however, Poole
states that he feels emotions similar to Jekyll’s when hearing of Jekyll’s sorrow, suggesting that
his desires to help the doctor are fostered by a sympathetic reaction rather than just loyalty. He
tells Utterson that when he put his ear to the locked door of Jekyll’s office and heard weeping
“like a woman or a lost soul,” he felt as though he could cry as well: “I came away with that
upon my heart, that I could have wept too” (32). This moment, in which Poole starts to feel the
same emotions as the man he assumes is Jekyll weeping inside his office, suggests that he is
imagining the despair that Jekyll must be feeling. Poole is sympathizing with a man fearing for
his life to the degree that he, too, could weep as though his soul were lost. And this intense
sympathy motivates Poole and Jekyll’s other servants to rescue Jekyll.
In contrast with their sympathetic feelings toward Jekyll, the characters in Jekyll and
Hyde refuse to identify imaginatively with Hyde, a man with whom it seems impossible to
sympathize. Because of his displeasing physiognomy and his violent interactions with others, the
characters cannot feel for Hyde even before they know of his evil misdeeds. Stevenson gives
unpleasant descriptions of Hyde early on in the novella, calling him “small, and very plainly
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dressed” with an appearance that, even from far away, “went somehow strongly against the
watcher’s inclination” (9). Physically, “Mr. Hyde was pale and dwarfish; he gave an impression
of deformity without any namable malformation, he had a displeasing smile, . . . and he spoke
with a husky, whispering and somewhat broken voice” (10). These descriptions suggest that the
characters have an instinctive revulsion toward Hyde, but they cannot specifically describe what
they hate about him. They are simply unable to imaginatively identify with him at all. Hume
predicts this reaction, writing, “We sympathize more with persons contiguous to us, than with
persons remote from us: With our acquaintance, than with strangers: With our countrymen, than
with foreigners” (340). Utterson analyzes Hyde’s uncanny figure, which leads him to
dehumanize Hyde: “There is something more, if I could find a name for it. God bless me, the
man seems hardly human!” (Stevenson 10). Hyde’s body feels foreign to the other characters to
the extent that they view him as inhuman, which makes him as foreign to others as a person can
be. They do not desire to identify or sympathize with this inhuman fiend, whose very body
conveys his otherness.
Compounding his deplorable physiognomy, Hyde perpetrates great acts of evil,
seemingly justifying a negative response and a removal of sympathy on the part of the other
characters. Hyde’s first act of violent perpetration occurs when he tramples a little girl. Other
characters are astonished at his cruelty. The physician who attends to the little girl, whom
Utterson describes as “about as emotional as a bagpipe” (3), reacts with anger despite his
typically emotionless demeanor. Utterson, after he has hold of Hyde, writes of the doctor:
Every time he looked at my prisoner, I saw that Sawbones turned sick and white with the
desire to kill him. I knew what was in his mind, just as he knew what was in mine; and
killing being out of the question, we did the next best. We told the man we could and
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would make such a scandal out of this, as should make his name stink from one end of
London to the other. (3)
Here, Utterson is willing to sympathize with the doctor. They know and understand each other’s
minds and work together in reaction to the situation. In contrast, not only do Utterson and the
physician refuse to feel sympathy for Hyde, they feel anger towards him, even desiring to kill
him.
After witnessing the heinous crime against the girl, Utterson and other characters become
hardened against Hyde. Smith explains that one feels resentment toward those who perpetrate,
primarily because of one’s fellow-feeling for those we believe are wronged: “Our sympathy with
the person whose motives we go along with, and whom, therefore, we look upon as in the right,
cannot but harden us against all fellow-feeling with the other, whom we necessarily regard as in
the wrong” (94). This hardening first takes place in the novella as a result of Hyde’s attack on the
child. After Hyde tramples the small girl, Utterson remarks that “if [Hyde] had any friends or any
credit, we undertook that he should lose them” (Stevenson 3). Utterson is ensuring that Hyde will
be shunned and therefore unable to function in Victorian society. Utterson goes on to describe
the enraged women who witness this crime to be “wild as harpies,” forming “a circle of . . .
hateful faces” around Hyde (3). They, too, resist any kind of feeling for Hyde and go so far as
trying to physically attack him.
Characters react with similar outrage after Stevenson describes Hyde’s murder of the
M.P. Sir Danvers Carew with chilling detail. A maid first sees an exchange between Sir Danvers
Carew and Hyde, believing that Carew was simply asking for directions. She describes Carew as
one who “seemed to breathe such an innocent and old-world kindness of disposition” (14). Hyde,
on the other hand, “seemed to listen with an ill-contained impatience” to Carew (14). This
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impatience apparently boils inside of Hyde until he suddenly “broke out on a great flame of
anger . . . [and] with ape-like fury, he was trampling his victim under foot, and hailing down a
storm of blows, under which the bones were audibly shattered and the body jumped upon the
roadway” (15). Jekyll’s maid witnesses the crime, but, “at the horror of these sights and sounds,
the maid fainted” (15). The maid is physically overcome with the horror of what she sees Hyde
do. Rather than allowing her imagination to conjure up the feelings of Hyde at this moment, the
maid goes unconscious, which is the furthest one can get from entering into another’s mind.
Instead of working through the unsettlement created by considering Hyde’s point of view, she
refuses to look, refuses to think, and therefore refuses to imagine and sympathize.
In terms of the self/other binary of sympathy, the characters are able to feel with Jekyll,
but they are unable to feel for Hyde and cast him off as an other. Sympathy, then, becomes a
reinforcement of larger thematic binaries in the text. However, while we can see this binary
reflected in the text, it is problematic to think of Jekyll and Hyde in binary terms because it is a
text that blurs binaries: Jekyll is Hyde and Hyde is Jekyll. Although readers and characters in the
novella look upon Hyde with revulsion as a being separate from Jekyll, Jekyll recalls after seeing
Hyde for the first time that “when I looked upon that ugly idol in the glass, I was conscious of no
repugnance, rather of a leap of welcome. This, too, was myself. It seemed natural and human”
(45). Even though at times he refers to Hyde as an “it,” Jekyll very clearly identifies as Hyde,
whom he deems to be a “natural” and “human” part of himself. Therefore, after learning of
Jekyll’s transformation, the characters will have to confront the horror that having sympathy for
one (Jekyll) necessitates having sympathy for the other (Hyde). Further complicating this, Jill
Matus points out that neither Jekyll nor Hyde is quite as unidimensional as he first appears. She
claims that “while Hyde is the evil side, Jekyll ought to be purely good. But he is still the
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mixture of the two, ‘that incongruous compound of whose reformation and improvement I had
already learned to despair’ (64)” (174). Thus the binaries that seem to divide a text like Jekyll
and Hyde so neatly do not “necessarily affirm binary logic, but complicat[e] it by demonstrating
how closely related binary opposites are” (Hendershot 35). This is where Smith and Hume fall
short when one attempts to analyze the workings of sympathy within the novella: Smith and
Hume’s theories of sympathy recognize people only when they are occupying one side or the
other of the self/other binary. Matus reminds readers that Jekyll and Hyde are both and thus
cannot be regarded in light of those notions of sympathy.
Recognizing this blurring shows that, despite the characters’ sympathetic alignment with
Jekyll, Jekyll is a perpetrator as well as a victim—not only because he is Hyde but also because
he commits questionable acts himself. He knows, for example, that his experiment has great
risks, which is evident in his musing: “I hesitated long before I put this theory to the test of
practice. I knew well that I risked death. . . . But the temptation of a discovery so singular and
profound, at last overcame my suggestions of alarm” (Stevenson 43–44). Jekyll is driven by a
desire for prominence and worldly success, even being initially willing to risk death in order to
discover something noteworthy. He also admits that, along with his desire for worldly success,
his motivations for becoming Hyde are not strictly objective—he enjoys his time as Hyde. This
enjoyment seems to stem from the idea “that Jekyll had already committed certain indelicate
acts” as is evident in his hiring a housekeeper who he knew would keep quiet (Ferrer-Medina
76). “How could Jekyll have learned of the housekeeper’s silence and apathy for virtue if not by
her indulgence of his past indelicacies?” Patricia Ferrer-Medina insightfully asks (76). His
indulgence in committing “indelicate acts” leads him to continue to take the drug that changes
him to Hyde. Jekyll recognizes that “the drug had no discriminating action; it was neither
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diabolical nor divine” (Stevenson 45). In other words, the drug itself does not choose whether or
not another evil or good version of Jekyll is created; rather, it is influenced by Jekyll’s mood.
While Jekyll cannot mitigate the effects of the drug that “shook the doors of the prisonhouse of
[his] disposition” (45), he is still the one who “concocts and drinks the potion unleashing the
diabolical Hyde” (D’Amato 101). The violence in the novella is inflicted by an agent: Jekyll.
In addition, Hyde, who is birthed from Jekyll’s experiment without a moral conscience, is
not solely a perpetrator but is also a victim. Hyde was bred to be evil and is not given a
conception of morality; he is therefore doomed to the fate that Jekyll creates for him, a fate that
involves death, Hyde’s biggest fear. Jekyll says that “Hyde alone, in the ranks of mankind, was
pure evil” (45), suggesting that Jekyll knows that Hyde’s passions will be problematic, but Hyde
is unable to conceive in moral terms the danger his existence presents to others. Jekyll, as Hyde,
feels “younger, lighter, happier in body,” but he is also “conscious of a heady recklessness, a
current of disordered sensual images running like a mill race in [his] fancy, a solution of the
bonds of obligation, an unknown but not an innocent freedom of the soul” (44). Like a child,
Hyde is reckless and unaware of any obligation to others, but unlike a child, his “freedom of the
soul” is not “innocent.” He is denied that innocence by Jekyll, who brings him into being for the
sole purpose of being able to perpetrate and then shift the consequences of his perpetration onto
Hyde, whom he knows will be reviled for his actions. When Jekyll laments his own loss of social
standing and quality of life, an unanticipated result of his experiment, he acknowledges that
Hyde does not have a full conception of what it means to function in an ethical society: “To cast
[my lot] in with Hyde was to die to a thousand interests and aspirations, and to become, at a blow
and for ever, despised and friendless” (48). Even though he admits that Hyde “would be not even
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conscious of all that he had lost” (48–49), this example still suggests that Jekyll knows well that
Hyde’s existence will always be one of pain, isolation, and rejection.
This subjugated existence, in which Hyde can only receive pleasure without structure or
discipline, would suggest that he might deserve some kind of sympathy as a victim as well as a
perpetrator. Created to fail in society, Hyde does not elicit sympathy from the characters in the
novella, but he does receive it from one early critic. Writing in 1888, Reverend Dr. John Aldwell
Nicholson asks of Jekyll’s and Hyde’s situation, “Who was to blame, who was the more guilty—
that poor animal that ravened through the world?” or Jekyll, “whose will . . . had done all, and
his will was guilty of all” (103–04). In the case of the “poor animal,” Hyde, “it must be
destroyed, . . . [but the destroyers] could almost weep for it while they destroyed it” (104). For
Nicholson, the criteria for identifying with the victim comes through will: Jekyll had the will to
make everything happen, whereas Hyde simply followed his instincts, as he was created to do.
Nicholson still wishes for Hyde to be destroyed and still views him as an “it,” but he sympathizes
with Hyde, the poor creature who is sacrificed to Jekyll’s pretentious experiment.
Notably, there is one more important figure who, perhaps unsurprisingly, also feels
sympathy for Hyde: Jekyll. Jekyll’s feeling for Hyde is first apparent when he tells Utterson of
his “great interest in poor Hyde” (13), a confession he makes as he asks Utterson to help Hyde if
the time ever comes when Jekyll is no longer around. While this could appear to be selfish for
those who know of Hyde’s true identity, Jekyll still feels for Hyde as a separate entity, especially
when corresponding with people who do not know the truth. Jekyll’s use of the word “poor”
suggests that there is something unfortunate about Hyde’s situation that could elicit sympathy.
Jekyll also sympathizes with Hyde briefly when he later recalls that Hyde’s “love of life is
wonderful; I go further; I, who sicken and freeze at the mere thought of him, when I recall the
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abjection and passion of this attachment, and when I know how he fears my power to cut him off
by suicide, I find it in my heart to pity him” (54). Here Jekyll taps into a Smithean version of
fellow-feeling; while Smith believes that sympathy encompasses “fellow-feeling with any
passion whatsoever,” he argues that “pity and compassion are words appropriated to signify our
fellow-feeling with the sorrow of others” (4). Therefore, even in all his bitterness and disgust
toward Hyde, Jekyll still pities Hyde as the victim of his experiment. In a seemingly clear
perpetrator/victim binary, the roles of perpetrator and victim are not easy to delineate.
Trauma and Empathic Unsettlement
After decades of thinking about the perpetrator/victim binary, trauma theorists have
noticed the same problem in life that Stevenson illustrates in literature: it is often difficult to
distinguish between perpetrators and victims. Sharon Lamb writes of the perpetrator/victim
duality, “As much as we might wish to return with clarity of vision to this simple duality, it may
be impossible to do so” (5). She suggests that blurring the lines between the perpetrator and the
victim can elicit critical thought about traumatic acts—acts like those Jekyll perpetrates as Hyde.
This needs to be undertaken, for, according to Lamb, “Too many books have examined victims
or perpetrators alone and so have not been challenged to commit to a consistent view of people
and apply the arguments they make for one (in terms of determinism, choice, and responsibility)
to the other” (3).
Dominick LaCapra similarly argues that perpetrators deserve a more nuanced
understanding, but he does not explicitly state it should come through empathy, in light of the
blurring of roles between perpetrator and victim. The traumatic situation, according to LaCapra,
is too simplified when the perpetrator and victim are considered as separate entities. He argues
that while some criticize the breakdown of the victim/perpetrator binary because of its potential
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to remove distinctions, which can run the risk of re-victimizing victims, and/or justifying
perpetration, “the deconstruction of binaries is fruitful in undoing the bases of a scapegoat
mechanism (sharply dividing self and other with the source of anxiety projected onto the
nefarious other)” (Writing History xxvi). LaCapra is particularly interested in thinking about
victims of trauma, but he also wonders, “May certain perpetrators not have earned or deserve
mourning (even empathy) but instead warrant modes of understanding insistently related to
critique?” (215). Finding such “modes of understanding” for perpetrators, however, is a difficult
and problematic process.
LaCapra does not explicitly theorize this process, but he does offer a potential tool for
thinking empathetically about perpetration and perpetrators in “empathic unsettlement,” which is
a more nuanced method of empathizing with an other. Although LaCapra applies this idea only
to victims of perpetration, he nevertheless suggests a way that all actors in a traumatic situation
might be considered empathically outside of binary terms. Empathic unsettlement involves
bearing witness to trauma by putting “oneself in the other’s position while recognizing the
difference of that position” (LaCapra, Writing History 78). This is a useful mode of critique
because it allows people to understand the traumatic experience of a victim without overly
identifying with it. LaCapra is careful about this because overidentification runs the risk of the
secondary witness practicing an “empathy [that] gives way to vicarious victimhood” (47), a
dangerous situation in which a witness begins to imagine himself or herself in place of the victim
and replaces the victim’s narrative with his or her own perceived victimhood. This would make
the secondary witnessing process futile by making the victim voiceless, replacing his or her
experience with the imagined experience of the witness.
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Unsettlement, then, exists as a conscious awareness of being an other, a witness, who will
not be fully able to understand the experiences of the victim even when one feels empathy for
that victim. LaCapra explains, “The role of empathy and empathic unsettlement in the attentive
secondary witness does not entail . . . identity” but rather “involves a kind of virtual experience”
(78) that is distinctly separate from one’s own experience. Like Smith and Hume, LaCapra posits
the necessity of imagination in understanding a victim’s position. LaCapra extends Hume’s and
Smith’s conceptions, however, because for him, empathic unsettlement is a deliberate process
meant to witness, record, and critically consider a traumatic situation rather than just a method of
sympathizing with a person who experiences it. This allows LaCapra to understand an other
sympathetically, with empathy, cultivating a modern equivalent of Smith’s “fellow-feeling” that
foregoes identification and also gives victims their own voices.
LaCapra is hesitant to extend empathic unsettlement to perpetrators, however, because he
fears that doing so would raise a number of ethical issues. Despite his hypothesizing about
perpetrators who might “warrant modes of understanding,” he believes that this understanding
can and should happen without empathy. He argues that although one can discuss a perpetrator’s
experiences as a type of “trauma,” thinking about this kind of trauma must not “entail the
equation or identification of perpetrator and victim” (Writing History 79). LaCapra does
recognize that there is a different kind of unsettlement (“antipathy, hatred”) that witnesses may
feel when hearing about acts of perpetration (104). But this unsettlement is not the unsettlement
felt for victims. It is an unsettlement that “may justifiably resist empathy in the sense of feeling
or understanding” (104). This leaves readers to wonder what kind of understanding, if not
empathic understanding, one should extend to perpetrators. For LaCapra, this understanding
must remain detached, for overidentifying with perpetrators (a risk that empathy entails) may
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devalue or possibly re-create the horrific acts committed. LaCapra is also concerned about
generalizing major losses in traumatic situations in a way that victimizes everyone, such as in the
case of mass genocide. “As a consequence,” he writes, “one encounters the dubious ideas that
everyone (including perpetrators or collaborators) is a victim, that all history is trauma, or that
we all share a pathological public sphere or a ‘wound culture’” (Writing History 64). This
suggests that one major problem with practicing empathic unsettlement for perpetrators is that
they will become conflated with victims, misidentifying the roles of victim, perpetrator, and
trauma.
Other trauma theorists are also well aware of the problems of extending empathy to
perpetrators. Roy F. Baumeister worries that by studying perpetrators too concertedly and trying
to “understand the perpetrators’ inner processes and attitudes,” people may “come to see their
crimes as considerably less heinous” than others judge them to be (367–68). Baumeister thus
raises the imperative ethical question: Is studying perpetrators worth the moral risk? Lamb
believes that it is worth the risk and that studying perpetrators can be done without justifying
perpetration. However, she recognizes that, regardless of who holds the status of perpetrator or
victim, it is important that people are careful not to ignore perpetration or to avoid holding
perpetrators accountable for their wrongdoings. She asserts, “We might and can still blame; we
just can’t do it as easily as we used to” (6). Lamb ultimately comes to the conclusion that any
discussion of perpetrators needs to involve censure so as not to minimize the experiences of the
victim.
The same fears resonate with literary critics who similarly find danger in the prospect of
readers responding empathetically to fictional villains. Susan Brison believes that romanticizing
villains in texts compromises how people perceive victims’ experiences both in fictional
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accounts and in real life, even more than if readers hated fictional and actual perpetrators. She
calls for more empathy for victims, arguing that “we are not taught to empathize with victims. In
crime novels and detective films, it is the villain, or the one who solves the murder mystery, who
attracts our attention; the victim, a merely passive pretext for our entertainment, is conveniently
disposed of—and forgotten—early on” (10). According to Brison, this fascination with villains
fosters a lack of empathy for victims, who experience the greatest repercussions from traumatic
events. Brison points out that even in fiction, characters and their traumatic situations can be
difficult to assess and can foster an attitude of apathy toward victims both real and fictional.
LaCapra and Brison are concerned about the ethical implications of analyzing victims
and perpetrators, even in fiction, but, as LaCapra suggests, it is important to consider the
perpetrator’s experience in context of a traumatic situation to capture a fuller picture of the
experience. Fiction provides an opportunity for presenting a thought experiment in which
empathic unsettlement may be extended to perpetrators without the same ethical risks of
performing such an experiment with actual perpetrators. As it stands, LaCapra’s notion of
empathic unsettlement provides an ethically responsible method for serving as a secondary
witness to trauma victims. But by refusing to extend this same empathic unsettlement to
perpetrators—even within the fictional world of a text—we also make the perpetrators voiceless
in the traumatic experience and make the narrative incomplete. While perpetrators certainly
cannot be equated with victims, and while they may not deserve equal empathetic consideration,
they, too, deserve the right to witness. In actual traumatic situations, it does not seem worth the
risk to extend empathic unsettlement to perpetrators, especially in light of the problems that
victims face in the witnessing process. But that risk greatly diminishes when the experiment is
used in literature where perpetration and re-victimization will not happen again. Having
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characters extend empathic unsettlement to perpetrators in a text provides the opportunity for
readers to observe the risks and benefits of allowing perpetrators to witness in the traumatic
experience. It also allows readers to see how extending empathic unsettlement might be done
successfully. In other words, one might use literature as a model for extending empathic
unsettlement in life. While this may seem dangerous to Brison, empathic unsettlement requires a
careful method of witnessing that could be applied to victims and perpetrators in a way that does
not ignore the victim.
Jekyll and Hyde is the perfect novella to practice such an experiment because it
challenges the binary thinking inherent in empathic unsettlement. Because the self/other or
victim/perpetrator binary is dismantled in Jekyll and Hyde, readers are presented with a situation
in which it is impossible to empathize only with the victim and not with the perpetrator or to
forget the victim in light of the perpetrator. Jekyll and Hyde also allows the reader to see the
potential consequences of extending empathic unsettlement to a perpetrator. Stevenson’s novella
further recommends itself for this experiment because within the text, the extension of empathic
unsettlement to both perpetrator and victim, or something that looks very much like it, is
undertaken twice. The first, unsuccessful attempt is carried out by Dr. Hastie Lanyon, a former
colleague and one-time friend of Dr. Jekyll’s. The second attempt, which seems reasonably
successful, is carried out by Mr. Gabriel John Utterson, a lawyer acquainted with both Lanyon
and Jekyll and the executor of Jekyll’s will. While Lanyon’s attempt suggests it is dangerous to
empathize with perpetrators, Utterson shows that through empathic unsettlement, an empathetic
secondary witness can successfully allow victims and perpetrators to witness to a traumatic event
without compromising either testimony, condoning perpetration, or ignoring victimhood.
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Empathic Unsettlement in Jekyll and Hyde
Dr. Lanyon was, at one point, one of Jekyll’s closest friends, which is why Jekyll
approaches Lanyon first when he finds himself in need of help. Lanyon, “a hearty, healthy,
dapper, red-faced gentleman, with a shock of hair prematurely white, and a boisterous and
decided manner” (7), agrees with Utterson that their shared friendship with Jekyll forms a “bond
of common interest” among the three of them (7). Lanyon has distanced himself from Jekyll
because of Jekyll’s “scientific balderdash” which Lanyon thinks has begun to make Jekyll
“wrong, wrong in the mind” (7), but he “continues[s] to take an interest in him [Jekyll] for old
sake’s sake” (7). Relying on this friendship and common interest, Jekyll reaches out to Dr.
Lanyon for empathy, reminding him of their longstanding friendship and begging for help in
procuring the necessary items to continue mixing the potion he has created. Despite the fact that
they “may have differed at times on scientific questions, [Jekyll] cannot remember, at least on
[his] side, any break in [their] affection” (36). Jekyll hopes this will be enough to elicit Lanyon’s
fellow-feeling, along with his assertion that “there was never a day when if you had said to me,
‘Jekyll, my life, my honour, my reason, depend on you,’ I would not have sacrificed my left hand
to help you” (36).
Lanyon, although wary of Jekyll’s experiments and motives, is still willing to
imaginatively identify with Jekyll and help when he is asked. He shares bonds with Jekyll, bonds
of professionalism, friendship, and real concern. Jekyll only asks Lanyon for help when he can
no longer help himself—when he has started to transform into Hyde without taking the potion
that he concocts, and he is out of his supplies. Lanyon, who is also a doctor, has access to the
supplies that Jekyll needs. Without explanation, Jekyll asks Lanyon to bring him a phial with his
mixtures and his notebook with enigmatic writing about the experiment. At this request, Lanyon
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wonders if Jekyll has gone insane but concludes that “till that was proved beyond the possibility
of doubt, I felt bound to do as he requested” (37). He is confused by Jekyll’s requests,
acknowledging that they “whetted his curiosity” (38) but “told [him] little that was definite”
(38). However, Lanyon, as a fellow doctor and scientist, understands the importance of materials
and notes in conducting experiments, and he brings the needed items to Dr. Jekyll, even though
he is a bit unsettled by Jekyll’s requests. Action, here, is the surest sign of Lanyon’s empathy.
When Lanyon brings the requested items to Jekyll’s home, he expects to find the poor Dr.
Jekyll who will offer an explanation for his seeming madness; instead he meets the “abnormal
and misbegotten” Hyde (39). “I had never set eyes on him before,” he remarks. “He was small,
as I have said; I was struck besides with the shocking expression of his face and . . . with the odd
subjective disturbance caused by his neighborhood” (38). Lanyon’s observation of the uncanny
Hyde, whose face is “so ghastly to see that I grew alarmed,” repels him and immediately
dissipates any fellow-feeling or empathy Lanyon was ready to extend to Jekyll (40). It does not,
however, dispel his curiosity, and Lanyon decides that he has “gone too far in the way of
inexplicable services to pause before [he] see[s] the end” (40). So he fearfully watches Hyde
consume the potion and then struggle until he completes the transformation into Jekyll, who
appears “like a man restored from death” (41). The transformation of Hyde into Jekyll is
horrifying to Lanyon: “‘O God!’ I screamed, and ‘O God!’ again and again” (41). In this
moment, he experiences the psychological trauma of seeing the perpetrator and victim blur into
the same being. His empathetic identification with Jekyll is erased as Jekyll becomes the
embodiment of the other. Lanyon witnesses this transformation grossly unfold, his mind
“submerged in terror” (41), and he is shattered.
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After this psychologically traumatic witnessing, Lanyon is unable to put Hyde/Jekyll’s
account of the experiment and the work leading up to it on paper—the “narrative” he eventually
writes for Utterson omits this information (36). When Utterson inquires about Jekyll, Lanyon
refuses to give him any information, telling him, “Some day, Utterson, after I am dead, you may
perhaps come to learn the right and wrong of this. I cannot tell you” (23). Even when his written
tale is revealed, it only outlines Lanyon’s experiences meeting Hyde and watching the
transformation take place. He does not record anything after the transformation, saying, “What
he told me in the next hour I cannot bring my mind to set on paper” (41). Lanyon even describes
his witnessing experience as traumatic: “My soul sickened at it . . . My life is shaken to its roots;
sleep has left me; the deadliest terror sits by me at all hours of the day and night; I feel that my
days are numbered, and that I must die; and yet I shall die incredulous” (41). The psychological
terror brought upon Lanyon at this revelation is too much for him to bear, and he commits
suicide. The only thing he says of Jekyll is, “As for the moral turpitude that man unveiled to me,
even with tears of penitence, I cannot, even in memory, dwell on it without a start of horror”
(41). Lanyon’s reaction is full of judgment. After witnessing Hyde become Jekyll, he sees Jekyll
as the nefarious and evil other with whom he cannot imaginatively identify or empathize.
Lanyon is unable to practice empathic unsettlement because he cannot conceive of
extending the empathy that he grudgingly had for Jekyll to Hyde. What LaCapra fears will
happen does happen in Lanyon’s case; Lanyon gives in to vicarious victimhood and his own tale
of horror replaces the original trauma narrative. Although he does record Hyde’s words during
the actual transformation, he frames Hyde’s experience around himself, describing his horror.
Further, when Jekyll tries to explain what happens, he ignores Jekyll’s witness because he is
“submerged in terror.” A successful application of empathic unsettlement “involves virtual not
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vicarious experience” (LaCapra, History 135), but Lanyon vicariously rather than virtually
experiences the brutal transformation, which ultimately causes him to commit suicide. The only
thing Lanyon writes of Jekyll’s testimony is that Jekyll is Hyde. After his traumatic incident, he
tells Utterson, “I wish to see or hear no more of Dr. Jekyll . . . I am quite done with that person;
and I beg that you will spare me any allusion to one whom I regard as dead” (23). By regarding
him as dead, Lanyon cuts off Jekyll’s ability to witness as either perpetrator or victim.
Lanyon’s response to Hyde and Jekyll is devoid of empathy and instead filled with his
own opinions, which he attributes to righteous indignation rather than mere hate. Lanyon first
defines his reaction to Hyde as “idiosyncratic, personal distaste” but then feels he has “reason to
believe the cause [of his reaction] to lie much deeper in the nature of man and to turn on some
nobler hinge than the principle of hatred” (39). Part of his response to the situation is to ensure
that he can no longer act as a secondary witness to Jekyll/Hyde by taking his own life. Lanyon’s
trauma “is so potent as to shock this seemingly robust person literally to death” (Eigner 146–47).
Lanyon is unable to practice empathic unsettlement for Jekyll because in doing so, he would be
forced to imagine himself in Hyde’s position without overly identifying with either man. He is
simply unable to do this because he is horrifically unsettled by the transformation and cannot
imagine a way to defend Jekyll. In an unexpected way, Lanyon thus becomes a secondary victim
of Jekyll’s experiment. The only escape he (like Jekyll) sees from the horror of the
transformation is suicide. Lanyon’s response, as though confirming LaCapra’s fears, suggests
that there is something gravely dangerous about empathizing with a perpetrator.
Mr. Utterson, on the other hand, does not become a vicarious victim; he manages to
extend empathic unsettlement to Jekyll/Hyde such that he becomes a successful secondary
witness to the trauma experienced by both victims/perpetrators. Part of the process of empathic
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unsettlement involves the witnesses understanding their own subjective involvement in the
witnessing process in order to avoid inserting too much of themselves into the narrative. Utterson
recognizes his subjective involvement when he shows his own understanding of the ways in
which binaries might be collapsed in a single individual: himself. Utterson has a number of
negative qualities: he is “dusty [and] dreary” (1), “drank gin when he was alone” (1), and is
“incline[d] to Cain’s heresy” (1). These qualities paint him as an unfriendly person who is not
inclined to be his brother’s keeper. Rather, he lets his “brother go to the devil in his own way”
(1), a description that would seem to mark him as a particularly unsympathetic character. But
Utterson is also “somehow lovable” (1), “thrives upon the mastery of the self” (O’Dell 513), and
therefore has control of his faculties. In addition, he does care for other people. He “ha[s] an
approved tolerance for others” and is “inclined to help rather than to reprove” (Stevenson 1).
Because of his willingness to associate with and help others at the moment of their downfalls, he
is “frequently . . . the last good influence in the lives of downgoing men” (1). But even when
interacting with these men, his face never reveals any disgust or horror. He “never marked a
shade of change in his demeanour” upon receiving them in his home (1). Utterson realizes that
something like Hyde lurks within him, but he also recognizes that he is not Jekyll or Hyde. He
sets himself up to identify his own subjectivity without claiming the experiences of Jekyll and
Hyde. This ability to be a nonjudgmental witness with a necessary amount of distance makes him
a prime example for practicing empathic unsettlement for a perpetrator because, “Utterson can
easily negotiate his contemporary landscape without falling victim to the threat of gross
improprieties” (O’Dell 513). Thus, Utterson can witness “improprieties” without becoming
tainted by them or horrified to the point of silence.
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Another of Utterson’s qualities that prepares him to invest empathy in Jekyll is his
commitment to act even when it seems that nothing can be done. This propels him to help Jekyll
even when he suspects that Jekyll is mixed up in shady business. Stevenson explains that
Utterson’s “affections, like ivy, were the growth of time” (1), and he has been friends with Jekyll
for a long time. Utterson reminds Lanyon of this when they are discussing Jekyll’s strange
behavior, asking if he can do anything for Jekyll because he wants to maintain his longstanding
friendship. Even with Lanyon’s bold declaration that “nothing can be done” to help Jekyll (23),
Utterson is “uneasy about poor Jekyll” (25) and believes “the presence of a friend might do him
good” (25). And Jekyll trusts Utterson to take care of Hyde: “If I am taken away, Utterson, I
wish you to promise me that you will bear with him and get his rights for him. I think you would,
if you knew all” (13). Jekyll trusts that Utterson is committed to his friends and to the law and
will therefore advocate for people when no one else will.
However, Utterson does not immediately extend empathic unsettlement toward Hyde—in
fact, he feels strong resentment toward him. At first, “it was his ignorance of Mr. Hyde that had
swelled his indignation” (6), but Utterson’s indignation grows even greater when Hyde’s name
“began to be clothed upon with detestable attributes” (6). He learns from Mr. Enfield that Hyde
trampled a small girl. He later replays the scene in his mind until it leads him to feel a kind of
horror through his imagination. The scene takes on many disturbing forms to the point that
Utterson’s “imagination [is] engaged, or rather enslaved” (8) by “Mr. Enfield’s tale” (8). As he
lies in his bed, he reimagines the city, Hyde, and the child, and he finally sees in his imagination
“that human Juggernaut tr[ea]d the child down and [pass] on regardless of her screams” (8). His
disgust for Hyde causes him a great deal of unsettlement that at times also extends to Jekyll,
which makes Utterson wary of extending empathy to his friend. He critiques Jekyll for
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associating with Hyde and for being close enough to him to sign over his possessions to the
detestable man in his will, a “document [that] had long been the lawyer’s eyesore” (6). Utterson
struggles to understand Jekyll’s motivations. He studies Hyde’s handwriting and is shocked
when he discovers that Hyde’s handwriting resembles Jekyll’s. “Henry Jekyll forge for a
murderer!” (21), he exclaims at the discovery, and “his blood ran cold in his veins” (21).
Rather than denying Jekyll empathy altogether, however, Utterson tries to understand
Jekyll’s motives for associating with Hyde. He begins to muse that Hyde must be coercing Jekyll
into doing his bidding. At first, Utterson believes that Jekyll’s association with Hyde stems from
madness, but he then “begin[s] to fear it is disgrace” (7). His fear for Jekyll and his lack of
understanding regarding Jekyll’s will encourage him to find out exactly who Hyde is and what
his relationship with Jekyll is: “If he be Mr. Hyde,” he posits, “I shall be Mr. Seek” (8). His
unsettlement for Hyde compels Utterson toward empathy for Jekyll, and he attempts to
understand the situation in order to help his friend. He also believes that he will understand
Jekyll’s problem by finding and confronting Hyde, postulating that if he sees Hyde, “he might
see a reason for his friend’s strange preference or bondage” (8). He follows Hyde to Jekyll’s
residence and learns from Jekyll’s butler, Poole, that Hyde comes and goes from Jekyll’s place.
Rather than reproving Jekyll for his association with Hyde, he empathizes with him. “Poor Harry
Jekyll,” he says, “my mind misgives me he is in deep waters!” (11). He believes Jekyll may be in
trouble because of “the ghost of some old sin” (11). Utterson compares Jekyll’s past with his
own in order to empathize with him, asserting that “his [Utterson’s] past was fairly blameless . . .
yet he was humbled to the dust by the many ill things he had done, and raised up again into a
sober and fearful gratitude by the many that he had come so near to doing, yet avoided” (11).
This practice of empathizing with Jekyll by relating his actions to his past mistakes sets Utterson
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up to practice empathic unsettlement for Hyde because he already understands that each person
commits, and has the potential to commit, ill actions.
Utterson is willing to empathize with Jekyll past the point that Lanyon was willing to
practice empathy for Jekyll. Utterson is prepared to offer empathy to Jekyll when Poole seeks
Utterson’s help in saving Jekyll from Hyde. When Utterson goes with Poole to Jekyll’s office, he
stumbles upon “the body of a self-destroyer” (33): Hyde, who has committed suicide. At this
point, Utterson believes that Hyde may have killed Jekyll, and he searches for evidence. Rather
than condemning Jekyll, however, he tells Poole that they “must be careful. I foresee that we
may yet involve your master in some dire catastrophe” (35). Utterson, still believing that Jekyll
is a different person from Hyde, is now trying to protect Jekyll. He finds some evidence, a
collection of papers, to help him understand Jekyll’s plight: a note from Jekyll describing the
contents of the papers, Dr. Lanyon’s narrative, and Henry Jekyll’s “Full Statement of the Case.”
Before reading all of this, Utterson tells Poole to “say nothing of this paper. If your master has
fled or is dead, we may at least save his credit” (35). He is willing to empathize with Jekyll
enough to protect his reputation.
It is remarkable that Utterson is able to react empathetically to Jekyll after discovering
the truth, but it is even more remarkable that Utterson allows Jekyll to witness in his own words
while he remains untraumatized by listening to the witness. In privacy, Utterson reads the three
documents starting with Jekyll’s note, moving to Lanyon’s narrative, and then ending with
Jekyll’s confession. Utterson can hear Jekyll’s traumatic situation through the words of another,
Lanyon, and then through Jekyll’s own words. In Lanyon’s tale, offered to Utterson in a letter
written just before his suicide, Lanyon describes Hyde’s transformation in terms of Lanyon’s
own experience and reaction. It becomes the story of Lanyon’s trauma, and not Jekyll’s, as
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Lanyon refuses to record Jekyll’s narrative. However, Utterson is presented with the opportunity
not only to read Jekyll’s narrative, but to also present it in Jekyll’s own words. Rather than
refusing to witness or inserting his identity into the narrative, he offers Jekyll’s “Full Statement
of the Case” for all to read. Utterson thus does what LaCapra describes and participates in “a
kind of virtual experience,” putting himself “in the other’s position while recognizing the
difference of that position and hence not taking the other’s place” (Writing History 78). Utterson
does this by reading Jekyll’s tale and then allowing Jekyll to speak directly to readers (Jekyll and
Hyde concludes, in fact, in Jekyll’s first-person voice, which comes through the narrative mouth
of Utterson). But Utterson does not supplant Jekyll or attempt to offer commentary on his letter,
nor does Utterson allow his empathy for Jekyll to draw him close enough to be traumatized by
Jekyll’s “Full Statement.” He witnesses with both sympathy and objectivity, empathy and
unsettlement, and he also dispels any fear that he will not hold Jekyll responsible for what
happened. While he goes home to read Jekyll’s “Full Statement” privately, he also commits to
come back to Jekyll’s office with Hyde’s dead body before midnight to “send for the police”
(35). Thus, Utterson will hear the confession, allowing Jekyll to witness, but will also seek
restitution for perpetration, especially because he does not know before reading the documents
whether Jekyll is still alive or if he murdered Hyde.
While readers do not see Utterson directly practice empathic unsettlement for Hyde in the
text, we do find him doing so for the story’s other perpetrator: Jekyll. This empathic
unsettlement, by extension, also applies to Hyde. Mr. Utterson’s empathic unsettlement for a
perpetrator is not a perfect model because he first believes that he is extending empathic
unsettlement to a victim. He, too, is repulsed by Hyde, but his friendship for Jekyll outweighs his
disdain for Hyde. After Jekyll begs him to “bear with [Hyde] and get his rights for him” (13),
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Utterson replies, “I can’t pretend that I shall ever like him,” to which Jekyll replies, “I don’t ask
that . . . I only ask for justice; I only ask you to help him for my sake, when I am no longer here”
(13). “Well,” Utterson says in return, “I promise” (13). This promise suggests that empathic
unsettlement starts for Utterson with his loyalty to a friend, and it is not reliant on agreeing with
or liking the perpetrator. Utterson’s desire to do this for the perpetrator Hyde may only come
about through empathy for a perceived victim, Jekyll. Thus, while Utterson is not a perfect
model for empathic unsettlement for a perpetrator, he has an open mind, which allows him to
protect Jekyll and to promise to protect Hyde to the best of his ability. He therefore identifies
with Hyde as a person who may need help and empathy by listening to Jekyll’s pleas for
Utterson to help Hyde. This implies that empathic unsettlement may require an identification
with perpetrators that goes beyond mere fellow-feeling, that asks witnesses to cultivate an active
discomfort with the process of witnessing (which, in this case, is virtual) that recognizes one’s
separateness from the perpetrators or victims. It requires an understanding that perpetrators, too,
might need an empathetic secondary witness who utilizes empathic unsettlement to give voice to
their part of the traumatic situation, which can happen without identifying with or condoning the
perpetration.
Conclusion
By the end of the novella we are left with three dead bodies (those of Carew, Lanyon, and
Jekyll/Hyde) and three stories (by Utterson, Lanyon, and Jekyll) that all witness, to differing
degrees and in different ways, to the trauma recounted by Stevenson. On the surface, it would
seem that Mr. Hyde received his just reward for perpetrating great acts of evil, including murder.
However, one could argue that Jekyll is just as responsible for the acts that were committed at
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the hands of Hyde. Both are perpetrators, and both are victims, making it impossible to utilize
empathic unsettlement only for victims.
It is noteworthy that Utterson is able to practice empathic unsettlement for both a victim
and a perpetrator, a potentially dangerous process that LaCapra believed would result in great
pain. And it does result in great pain for Dr. Lanyon, who dies in his attempt to witness for and
empathize with a perpetrator. In Mr. Utterson’s case, however, something unique happens.
Utterson is able to feel for and with a perpetrator and a victim, ultimately becoming a secondary
witness to both traumatic experiences. He does this without becoming mad or committing
suicide, and he is able to withhold judgment without withholding empathy. Unlike Lanyon,
Utterson realizes that Jekyll is Hyde, and he quietly, thoughtfully accepts this blurring of binaries
without withdrawing his empathy for a man he knows is also a perpetrator and without becoming
psychologically compromised in the process. Utterson both protects Jekyll/Hyde and acts as a
witness to the traumatic acts committed by him/them. Occupying a position in between the
binaries of good and evil himself, he practices empathic unsettlement by allowing Jekyll to
witness without pardoning his deeds or injecting any of his own fears or biases into Jekyll’s
testimony. Utterson is slow to condemn without facts and does not allow personal feelings to get
in the way of these facts. He also recognizes his subjectivity in the witness process and is careful
to try to remove himself from Jekyll’s narrative. His fictional practice of empathic unsettlement
is thus able to capture the traumatic experience from the angle of both the perpetrator and the
victim.
By doing this, Utterson participates in a difficult witnessing process and uses his
unsettlement to hear Jekyll’s narrative as a victim and as a perpetrator without attempting to
bring the narrative to some kind of successful resolution. LaCapra argues that “one might
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contend that in all cases [unsettlement] inhibits or prevents unmodulated, neopositivistic
objectification, unmediated identification, and harmonizing narratives” (History 136). Thus, even
in the cases of perpetrators, empathic unsettlement avoids turning a narrative of trauma into a
narrative of hope or healing that ignores the manner in which the perpetrator affected the
traumatic situation. A harmonizing narrative of Jekyll and Hyde would ignore the fact that Jekyll
was Hyde; it would show Hyde’s perpetration as senseless acts committed by an inhuman fiend,
and it would paint Jekyll as a fully blameless victim of the monstrous Hyde. This depiction
makes Hyde seem more heinous than he is, and it also absolves Jekyll from all responsibility.
Empathic unsettlement provides a way to prevent this from happening.
Mr. Utterson’s extension of empathic unsettlement is not, of course, perfect. He initially
eschews Hyde as all of the other characters do. Utterson’s fierce loyalty to Jekyll is the only
reason that he even associates with Hyde. However, it is this fierce loyalty to Jekyll that allows
him to consider things from Jekyll’s perspective as Hyde. Utterson does what Lanyon cannot do:
he gives Jekyll, both as a victim and perpetrator, a voice. He models the necessary qualities for
practicing empathic unsettlement for a perpetrator: being able to recognize the potential for
everyone to do evil, being willing to identify with someone enough to understand motive and
perhaps prevent future perpetration, and giving perpetrators a chance to have a secondary witness
record their side of the story so as to mitigate biased representations of a traumatic situation.
Notably, he moderates his unsettlement by refusing to condone the perpetration, but he avoids
neatly reconciling the narrative by not offering moral commentary on Jekyll’s or Hyde’s actions
after reading Jekyll’s full confession. Rather, he is the means by which the story is able to be
told, and he presents the opportunity for critical thought and discussion about the nature and
genesis of perpetration.
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Mr. Utterson also extends empathic unsettlement to Jekyll as a victim. Utterson tries to
help Jekyll in his time of need and is moved by his distress. Though he is unsettled by Jekyll’s
association with Hyde, he agrees to help Hyde and do Jekyll’s bidding, even though he does not
understand their attachment, showing that his empathy goes beyond mere fellow-feeling.
Through his unsettlement, Utterson recognizes the difference of his position with Jekyll and
constantly gives Jekyll the benefit of the doubt. To avoid his subjective part in the witnessing
when he does provide the whole narrative, he presents the tale from the words of the actual
victims and perpetrators, the only parts of the novella that are not told from Utterson’s
perspective. In so doing, readers are allowed to feel empathy for Jekyll and to better understand
his attachment to Hyde and the horrors of his transformation.
Viewing Stevenson’s Jekyll and Hyde through the lens of empathic unsettlement suggests
that LaCapra’s theory does provide a way to assess the traumatic situation in greater complexity.
The narrative becomes more complicated, but empathic unsettlement allows one fact to remain
central: that Jekyll is Hyde. Unsettlement is necessary for one to enter into the mind of Jekyll as
Hyde because he is a nefarious other, but refusing the witness of him as a perpetrator refuses the
witness of him as a victim. Additionally, ignoring a perpetrator like Hyde and denying him
empathic unsettlement would result in the loss of his narrative—an essential part of the narrative
of trauma recounted by Stevenson. If the goal of empathic unsettlement is to avoid both
“unmediated identification and harmonizing narratives,” then extending empathic unsettlement
to both perpetrators and victims achieves that goal. Without Utterson’s empathic unsettlement
toward Jekyll, and by extension Hyde, one of the greatest tales of good and evil would not exist.
One cannot understand Jekyll without knowing the nature of Hyde, suggesting that empathic
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unsettlement is most powerful when it is extended to both perpetrators and victims as a tool for
witnessing.
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